








Islands of Stability or Swamps of Insecurity?	  
MONUSCO’s Intervent ion Brigade and the Danger  o f  Emerging Secur i ty  
Voids in eastern Congo 
Chris toph Voge l
2013 might enter into history as a 
turning point for both United Nations 
(UN) peacekeeping and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) two 
decades of armed conflicts1.  Both 
accustomed to negative reporting and 
daunting outlooks, they are similarly 
affected by a paradigm shift in 
international intervention that finds its 
precedent in MONUSCO, the Mission 
des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation 
du Congo2. 
 
In resolution 2098 adopted on February 2013, 
the UN Security Council added considerable 
spice to a yet Chapter VII-mandated 
multidimensional peacekeeping operation, 
currently the largest of its kind. While core tasks 
of MONUSCO remained unchanged – 
protection of civilians and restoration of state 
authority – the so-called Force Intervention 
Brigade (FIB) was invigorated to “neutralise all 
                                                                  
1 For two background readings on the conflict, see 
Vlassenroot, Koen/Raeymakers, Timothy (ed., 2004): 
Conflict and social transformation in eastern DR Congo. 
Academia Press, Gent and Stearns, Jason (2011): Dancing 
in the Glory of Monsters. The Collapse of the Congo and 
the Great War of Africa. Public Affairs, New York. 
2 See www.monusco.unmissions.org. 
negative forces”3, as non-state armed groups are 
usually called in diplomatic lingo. 
What followed was the deployment of 3069 
additional troops supplied by South Africa, 
Tanzania, and Malawi – finalised in October 
2013. Up to date, the FIB has engaged alongside 
increasingly belligerent and cohesive Forces 
Armées de la République Démocratique du 
Congo (FARDC, the national army)4 in 
defeating the mouvement du 23 mars (M23). 
The latter, a rebel army led by renegade 
commander Sultani Makenga came up as the 
central government’s main opponent in the 
chronically unstable Kivu provinces between 
April 2012 and October 2013. While preliminary 
success seems to accompany MONUSCO’s new 
approach and FARDC’s rejuvenation, the 
overall security situation has not visibly 
improved as over fifty different armed groups 
ranging from neatly structured militias to ragtag 
                                                                  
3 UN Security Council (2013): Resolution S/RES/2098. 
United Nations, New York. 
4 After losing North Kivu’s capital, Goma, to the M23 in 
November 2012, FARDC internal structures appear to 
have undergone considerable improvement, which has 
been observed on the battlefield since July 2013. 
Concomitant support by the FIB has played a role in that 
but is unlikely to be the sole driver of these shifts. 
 
 




bandit gangs continue to operate across eastern 
DRC5. 
Instead of islands of stability, as the UN now 
suggests6, swamps of insecurity – in terms of 
overlapping and hybrid, non-state governance 
arrangements and disaggregated, negotiated 
oligopolies of violence – could be the result of 
the ongoing power reshufflings in eastern DRC7.  
Upcoming military operations against groups 
such as Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied 
Democratic Forces (ADF) are likely to pose 
huge challenges to both the FIB and FARDC. 
A COMPLEX TOPOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT 
AND GOVERNANCE 
With FARDC and MONUSCO targeting the 
meanwhile defeated M23, a myriad of other 
groups have been outside media attention. They 
vary in size (from dozens to thousands), 
alignment (pro- or anti-government), rationales 
(pragmatic vs. ideological), and structure 
(hierarchical vs. decentralised). M23 only 
represented one type in a broad scale of armed 
groups. Opposite in the spectrum are Mayi Mayi 
groups and the Raia Mutomboki, an umbrella 
term for decentralised self-defence groups 
founded to counter continuous threats by 
FDLR, last remnants of the Rwandan 
interahamwe, or groups such as RCD and 
                                                                  
5 Vogel, Christoph (2013): Mapping Armed Groups in 
eastern Congo, at www.christophvogel.net/mapping. 
6 MONUSCO concept paper on ‘islands of stability’, on 
file with the author. 
7 The here mentioned metaphors draw from the notions 
of governance without government (Raeymakers, 
Timothy/Menkhaus, Ken/Vlassenroot, Koen (2008): 
State and non-state regulation in African protracted crises: 
governance without government? Afrika Focus, Vol. 21, 
No. 2, pp. 7–21), negotiated statehood (Hagmann, 
Tobias/Péclard, Didier (eds., 2011): Negotiating 
Statehood. Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa. 
Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester.), and twilight institutions 
(Lund, Christian (2006): Twilight Institutions: Public 
Authority and Local Politics in Africa, in: Development 
and Change, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 685–705.) 
CNDP, predecessors of M23.8 Other big groups 
include Nyatura or APCLS.9 
Most groups vary in diffusion and relevance, 
such as in the use of social, political, and 
economic capital. Stimulated by state neglect 
and opposition among each other as well as 
against parts of the government army, most 
groups create their own micro-units in which 
governance is exerted beyond or in spite of 
classic ‘state rule’. The blending of militarised 
and civilian spheres at local levels makes it 
difficult to discover not only the way the 
Congolese state is contested but also how it is 
reproduced in eastern DRC’s everyday life. In 
addition, most non-state armed groups engage 
in fine-branched cohabitation and collaboration 
networks – some durable, others quickly untied 
or reshaped. Individual commanders within 
FARDC and political or economic elites are vital 
in these networks as the UN Group of Experts 
revealed for the case of General Amisi10.  
Bigmen, acting as “rebels in suits”, use their 
clout to either sponsor militias or bolster stray 
army units for the own ends11. 
Against this background it appears hard to 
believe that MONUSCO’s emboldened mandate 
and setup will turn out as a silver bullet for more 
than two decades of complex and multilayered 
                                                                  
8 The Rassemblement des Congolais pour la Démocratie 
(RCD, split into RCD-Goma, RCD-Kisangani, and RCD-
National) and the Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple (CNDP) are rebel armies that notwithstanding 
their own political agenda also to some extent operated as 
proxy forces of the Rwandan government around 2000 
and from 2006–2009 respectively. 
9 Vogel, Christoph 2013 and Stearns, Jason (2013): 
PARECO. Land, local strongmen, and the roots of militia 
politics in North Kivu. Usalama Project Report. Rift 
Valley Institute, London/Nairobi. 
10 UN Security Council (2012): Final Report of the Group 
of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
S/2012/843. UN, New York. 
11 See Utas, Mats (ed., 2012): African Conflicts and 
Informal Power. Big Men and Networks. Zed Books, 
London and Verweijen, Judith (2013b): Rebels in Suits: 
tackling civilian support networks of armed groups in the 








competition in a geographically challenging area. 
While the latter is key to the peacekeeping 
mission’s weakness in protecting civilians, 
FARDC’s role in these interwoven power 
struggles poses a paradoxical challenge to the 
UN’s task of restoring state authority: the army 
is just one of the many abusive forces in the 
area. This multiplies yet inherent political and 
operational impediments typical to each 
integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping 
mission.12  Nonetheless, the ‘community of fate’ 
between FARDC and MONUSCO has been 
successful since General François Olenga and 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
(SRSG) Martin Kobler took over the lead, 
respectively.  
FACTORS FOR RECENT FARDC SUCCESSES  
Without doubt, MONUSCO’s changed 
character has been vital to what has been 
observed as a massive shift from ineptitude to 
assertiveness in FARDC’s performance between 
November 2012 (when M23 almost by default 
captured Goma) and July 2013 (when 
commando and rapid response units initiated a 
series of military successes before the doors of 
North Kivu’s provincial capital). Earlier 
mentioned factors, i.e. the sacking and sidelining 
of certain individuals and the re-assignment of 
key posts in North Kivu’s military region have 
played a crucial role. In addition, improved 
supply lines (both through MONUSCO and 
own FARDC channels) have contributed to a 
boost in morale among combatants, yet 
amplified by increasing popular support, in 
particular directed to Col. Mamadou Ndala, the 
army’s operational commander in North Kivu, 
whose death near Beni on 2 January 2014 
(probably by other FARDC elements) could 
have a wider impact. All that was additionally 
                                                                  
12 See Reynaert, Julie (2010): MONUC/MONUSCO and 
Civilian Protection in the Kivus. Interns and Volunteers 
Series. IPIS, Antwerp and Humanitarian Policy Group & 
Stimson Center (2011): UN Integration and Humanitarian 
Space. ODI/Stimson, London/Washington. 
fostered by the fact that M23 largely failed in 
attracting the populations’ sympathy.  
Beyond missing civilian support, a few other 
weaknesses of M23 have surfaced from early 
2013. Most notably, February’s internecine 
fighting between the kifuafua (Sultani Makenga) 
and kimbelembele (Bosco Ntaganda)13 factions 
made up for large troop losses on the side of 
Makenga who emerged as new and old military 
leader of the group afterwards. At the same 
time, there was increasing international pressure 
– sparked by a controversial report in which the 
UN Group of Experts detailed the 
pervasiveness of Rwandan and Ugandan support 
to M23. Regardless whether these accusations 
are true or false, they caused an unprecedented 
amount of critique and asset freezing, which in 
turn is likely to have influenced policy in DRC’s 
neighbour states in one way or another. 
While it is unclear if and how Rwanda had 
helped M23 before, the current events suggest 
such support had completely waned by mid-
2013. Not only did the post-split M23 leadership 
have strained relations with Kigali, but also ties 
between the communities M23 claims to 
represent have somewhat soured over time.14  
This is the case for M23’s operational 
commander, Sultani Makenga. His wing of M23 
is even alleged to have linked up with Faustin 
Kayumba Nyamwasa, a dissident general and 
opposition figure. All this made for a tense 
position out of which the leadership around 
Makenga and Bertrand Bisimwa, the 
                                                                  
13 Bosco Ntaganda, a former UPC commander, CNDP 
leader, and FARDC general is a tipping point in the 
emergence of M23. Meanwhile he surrendered to the US 
embassy in Kigali and has been transferred to the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague. 
14 M23 mostly represents rwandophone people such as 
Banyabwisha and Banyajomba, while South Kivu’s 
Banyamulenge never supported the rebellion. While much 
of M23’s military leadership is made up of ‘Congolese 
Tutsi’, it is simplistic to speak of an ethnic rebellion given 
the implication of other communities and the clan system 








movement’s political head, could not create a 
position of strength similar to that of CNDP 
around 2008.15  
The use of proxies has also helped FARDC: 
While government-aligned militias served as 
buffer, they increased security issues on the side 
of M23. Main ‘troop contributors’ to the 
Kinshasa side have been APCLS, Nyatura (these 
cases include a few more or less officially 
integrated battalions), and a few smaller militias. 
While FDLR cohabitation and collaboration 
with FARDC happened in several cases, there 
has not been enough reliable confirmation of 
them fighting alongside FARDC troops such as 
M23 press releases suggested. Coupled with 
improvements from within, the aforementioned 
external factors have eminently contributed to 
FARDC’s reincarnation as a real army. This 
observation, however, is tightly linked to the 
M23-complex. A combination of nationalist-
xenophobic feelings against perceived invasion 
and asymmetric local support networks (which 
M23 lacked throughout its existence) brought 
along this shift in the long run. Dealing with 
other ‘negative forces’ and addressing the 
massive need of further reform will require a far 
more elaborated set of measures and policies. 
MONUSCO: FROM TOOTHLESS TIGER 
TO…? 
Not expected by everyone, the FIB performed 
much better than forecast. During the process 
of deployment some units already got implicated 
in fighting as FARDC attacked M23 around 
Kibumba in August 2013. The robust approach 
employed by Tanzanian and South African 
peacekeepers, the latter partly acting as snipers 
to kill M23 officers, balanced a bumpy start 
when a ‘security zone’ was declared by the 
humanitarian coordinator – at that time acting 
                                                                  
15 See Stearns, Jason (2012b): From CNDP to M23. The 
evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo. 
Usalama Project Report. Rift Valley Institute, 
London/Nairobi. 
SRSG – that actually did not involve any militias 
anyways. Shortly after though, concrete action 
and concomitant leadership language and 
manners16 enhanced MONUSCO’s capacity as a 
deterrent, if not more than that.17  
Reports have detailed to which extent the FIB 
has been implicated with ground and aerial 
assets in the advances against M23 positions, in 
particular in October 2013.18  While this is a 
comparable success story, it should not be 
misinterpreted as a fast-selling trend either. The 
exclusive concentration on M23 has helped the 
FIB a big deal in acting in a focused and 
determined fashion. Although the mandate 
stipulates engagement with all groups the so-
called intervention brigade, in its current shape 
and setup, neither has the military capacity nor 
the logistic means to tackle all armed groups at 
the same time. Whether or not this new form of 
UN peacekeeping can achieve lasting success 
thus depends on how effectively it can engage 
with groups such as FDLR, ADF, NDC Sheka, 
Raia Mutomboki, or others. Given that some of 
these employ particularly asymmetrical tactics 
and dispose over modus operandi which are 
hard to calculate, it is not only difficult to find 
and fight them but also to actually clarify who is 
a combatant and who not. MONUSCO’s 
imperative with regards to civilian protection 
makes the FIB’s tasks a ride on a thin line. 
ISLANDS OF STABILITY OR SWAMPS OF 
INSECURITY?  
Adapted from other contexts, a specific 
terminology began to dominate MONUSCO 
                                                                  
16 Personified by SRSG Kobler, Force Commander Lt.-
Gen. dos Santos Cruz, and FIB Commander Brig.-Gen. 
Mwakibolwa. 
17 For a critical comparative analysis of 
MONUC/MONUSCO’s historical performance, see Tull, 
Dennis M. (2009): Peacekeeping in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War, in: 
International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No. 2, pp. 215–230. 









strategy papers as the FIB started actual 
operations: the idea of establishing so-called 
‘islands of stability’ in eastern DRC has gained 
currency under the mission’s new head Martin 
Kobler: 
The overall objective of the “Islands of Stability” is to 
prevent an immediate relapse of the communities concerned 
into a cycle of violence after armed groups have freed an area 
– either due to successful FIB and/or FARDC clearing 
operations or negotiations with armed groups, through an 
integrated – multi-dimensional and multi-stakeholders, 
holistic but targeted 6-month initial response.19 
Embedded in and placed between the current 
UN Security Council resolution, the Peace 
Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF, 
‘11+4’ or ‘Addis Agreement’)20 and the 
Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Mary 
Robinson’s ‘Framework of Hope’21, such islands 
shall be established across eastern DRC. In a 
somehow ‘shape-clear-hold-build’ logic, 
MONUSCO (primordially the FIB with 
FARDC) wants to regain authority – with and 
for the DRC government – over increasing parts 
of the Kivu provinces. This is risky for a whole 
set of reasons, both the political and operational 
side of the ‘COIN’.  
Starting with the political implications, the 
notion of islands strongly refers to a segregation 
of priorities. While some areas will be 
considered important, or strategic, others in 
reverse will be neglected. It is hard to believe 
that zones already neglected by MONUSCO 
and FARDC before will all of a sudden become 
focus areas. Obviously, MONUSCO’s 
perception in these zones could become 
seriously jeopardised in consequence, such as 
                                                                  
19 MONUSCO concept paper on ‘islands of stability’, on 







that of UN and non-UN humanitarian actors 
often assimilated. Then, an impression of 
l’Afrique utile obtrudes itself upon the islands 
concept. More concretely, the post-colonial grip 
over DRC might be reassumed in a structural 
way as islands of stability could turn into the 
mere reproduction of metropolis-periphery 
relations and ossify yet existing divides between 
remote and connected places. Moreover, a 
parallelism to existing efforts in the field of 
mining governance (mainly targeting the 
formalisation of artisanal, informal production 
modes through monopolist, closed-pipeline 
schemes) is obvious and reinforces exactly this 
tendency.  
The further political danger connected to the 
establishment of islands of stability is the 
concomitant perpetuation of areas of instability, 
more provocatively termed as swamps of 
insecurity. Wherever there is an island – be it at 
the shores of Somalia or at the margins between 
Walikale and Shabunda – the surrounding areas 
are likely to lack stability as opposed to the 
island. More than a decade of UN peacekeeping 
presence, mediocre DDR programmes, and 
misled army reform (mixage, brassage, and 
regimentation) overtly indicate how insecurity 
and imbalances in security provision create 
tensions and security voids on local levels.22  The 
availability of weaponry and ammunition can be 
conducive in helping self-defence groups to 
emerge, which will eventually turn into full-
fledged militias later.  
Years of subsequent UN Security Council 
resolutions since 2008 have drawn MONUSCO 
into a ‘community of fate’ with the DRC 
government. In turn, reality in eastern Congo 
                                                                  
22 See Eriksson Baaz, Maria/Verweijen, Judith (2013a): 
Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic 
Trajectory of the Congolese Army. SSRC, New York and 
Eriksson Baaz, Maria/Verweijen, Judith (2013b): The 
Volatility of a half-cooked Bouillabaisse: Rebelmilitary 
integration and conflict dynamics in eastern DRC, in 
African Affairs, Vol. 112, No. 449, pp. 563–582. 
 
 




features daily contest of this government, 
reconfiguration of authority, reinvention of 
norms, overlapping modes of governance, and 
multiple sources of legitimation. MONUSCO’s 
mandate does not capture this complexity. The 
notion of ‘islands of stability’ can exacerbate this 
mismatch and enforce dominant narratives 
about the Congolese conflicts.23  By definition, it 
draws from an orthodox idea of statehood and 
governance that does not take into account 
more fluid geographical and social dynamics. 
Operationally, MONUSCO’s capacity is difficult 
to assess given the recent nature of the FIB. 
Before the latter has entered the field, the 
mission has had serious constraints in terms of 
staffing the necessary number of bases in areas 
defined as ‘must- and should-protect’ in its 
internal communication.24  Despite already 
17,000 troops on the ground, the mission 
dramatically lacked manpower and logistics to 
cover the vastness of the conflict areas. 
Numbering 20,000 meanwhile, and with an 
impending further shift of personnel to the 
eastern parts of DRC, there is a fair amount of 
hope that prevailing capacity problems can be 
addressed. Still, this is by no means a panacea to 
increase security and protection overall. 
Establishing islands of stability requires military 
follow-up after securing an area, i.e. disarming 
one or several militias that used to control a 
given area before.  
A ‘clear-hold-shape-build’ approach requires 
massive resources and reliable national partners 
as the case of Afghanistan (although hardly 
comparable with DRC otherwise) tells. While 
the US army and its allies struggle despite 84,271 
soldiers – roughly four times as many than 
MONUSCO – Afghan security forces show a 
                                                                  
23 Autesserre, Séverine (2012): Dangerous Tales: 
Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their unintended 
consequences. African Affairs, Vol. 111, No. 443. Royal 
African Society, London. 
24 MONUSCO internal report on ‘protection matrix’, on 
file with the author. 
mixed performance in providing security. 
Recent experiences of violence and plunder 
within FARDC indicate that at least some units 
are barely behaving better than blueprint militia 
groups. However, the FARDC – and the 
Congolese police – would be of crucial 
importance to implement such an approach.  
However, this remains another casse-tête. 
Despite improvements in recent months overall 
security sector reform (SSR) as a cornerstone of 
effective and reliable defence institutions 
continues to depend on political willingness of 
the Congolese government.25  However much 
MONUSCO or other stakeholders have pushed 
for further steps in this regard, the current state 
of the art shows wide arrays for further 
improvement – only the so-called bancarisation 
can be regarded mostly as a success story so far.26 
Ongoing military trials bring along a glimmer of 
hope that impunity will decrease.27  MONUSCO 
will sooner or later depend on FARDC to take 
over security provision in certain areas. Whether 
ill-disciplined army units will be sidelined or not 
can be determining for such takeovers. Also, this 
appears little realistic for a few reasons: The 
current shape of the Congolese army indicates a 
three-pronged structure: While the foreign-
trained elite units (referred to as ‘unités de 
reaction rapide/URR) and the Republican 
Guards (similarly elite units, but specifically 
trained for serving the presidency) are at least in 
parts excellent military, the bulk of ‘normal’ 
FARDC is unlikely to be a prime provider of 
                                                                  
25 See Stearns, Jason/Verweijen, Judith/Eriksson Baaz, 
Maria (2013): The national army and armed groups in the 
eastern Congo. Untangling the Gordian knot of insecurity. 
Usalama Project Report. Rift Valley Institute, 
London/Nairobi. 
26 Aiming at the establishment of electronic salary 
payment within FARDC, the bancarisation has been 
fostered by international donors and supported by 












security over large areas. Secondly, internal turf 
wars are heightening within the FARDC 
command structure. The killing of Col. Mamadou 
Ndala, operational commander of the URR 
operations against M23, is a clear indication that 
shows how tense relations between i.e. the 
Republican Guard and the URR units are. 
Moreover, the case of Mamadou is emblematic 
for another rift in the army, possibly pitting the 
Commander of Land Forces and the Army Chief 
of Staff against each other.  
The example of Raia Mutomboki gives a 
casebook example on how long-term obstacles 
for external peacekeeping might be framed.28 
Loosely organised, this franchise-like militia is 
an outlier in the landscape of armed groups in 
eastern DRC. Raia Mutomboki, as a rather 
recent wave of armed insurrection, is illustrative 
to the idea of incertitude that ignites armed 
conflict in the area: Born in response to FDLR 
assaults, the label has resurged in a context of ill-
guided FARDC policies, including the 
regimentation process. In this approach, the 
DRC had tried to catch up with some of the 
shortcomings of previous integration of former 
armed groups into the national army.29 
However, the regimentation process led to a 
situation whereby whole areas were, at least 
temporarily, abandoned by the army, increased 
insecurity being the result. In sequence, the 
                                                                  
28 Cf. Stearns, Jason et al. (2013): Raia Mutomboki. The 
flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an 
armed franchise. Usalama Project Report. Rift Valley 
Institute, London/Nairobi and Vogel, Christoph (2013): 
Emergence, mobilisation, and transformation of Raia 
Mutomboki. How state contest, dismal DDR, and local 
security dilemmas shape militia politics in South Kivu. 
Paper presented at the NAI/RLP Workshop on Armed 
Forces and Conflict Dynamics in the Great Lakes Region. 
Kampala. 
29 In the so-called mixage and brassage processes, armed 
groups had to be integrated into FARDC while their 
internal chains of command and their local embededness, 
i.e. in mining areas, was to be broken up. Seen from now, 
these processes largely turned out as failures, as they 
helped some influential ex-rebel and FARDC 
commanders to tighten their grip on certain commercial 
activities. 
emergence of Raia Mutomboki as a popular 
defence force has been additionally boosted.  
Meanwhile, many Raia Mutomboki are on the 
brink of being captured by professional 
revolutionaries while still recruiting and 
mobilising on a very local basis.30 While some of 
them are, since M23’s demise, playing the 
demobilisation card the underlying security 
issues remain unsolved. Setting up islands of 
stability in their Shabunda strongholds will 
obviously either turn out into the mere 
securitisation of urban areas or demand massive 
additional investments in local-level peacebuilding.  
ET ALORS…? 
The emergence and persistence of local security 
voids remains a characteristic of eastern Congo. 
While MONUSCO has silenced traditional 
critiques against their agony by massively 
intervening in the fight against M23, questions 
over its operational capacities and political 
partiality are undeniable. So far, the establishment 
of ‘islands of stability’ appears to be a new logo for 
a yet existing approach: Securing militarily strategic 
zones plus those rated as ‘must-protect’.  
In the long run, this will reinforce the swamps of 
insecurity floating around the centres. This is not 
MONUSCO’s fault, despite being the UN’s largest 
peacekeeping mission it is wishful thinking to 
pacify a vast inaccessible place like eastern Congo. 
Policymakers in New York and in key donor 
capitals need to understand that neither with nor 
without the FIB, the capacities of MONUSCO 
will be sufficient for a forceful overall military 
victory. Any long-term solution will be political. 
Given the plethora of rival powerbrokers across 
eastern DRC it is also unlikely that complete state 
authority can be restored anytime soon – even if 
President Kabila announced this in his address to 
                                                                  
30 Cf. Musamba Bussy, Josaphat (2013): La dynamique du 
recrutement et de la mobilisation des Raia Mutomboki. 
Unpublished paper, Bukavu and Jourdan, Luca (2011): 
Mayi Mayi: Young Rebels in Kivu, DRC, in: African 
Development, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 89–111. 
 
 




the nation pursuant to M23’s retreat. The resulting 
question is, what alternatives are on the table? 
One of the approaches, slowly becoming an 
evergreen in diplomatic discussion in and on the 
DRC, consists in holding local elections. The 
neglect of rural and remote areas in eastern 
Congo has not only resulted in precarious 
security dynamics as shown above, it had evenly 
dismantled popular trust in the political system. 
Contrary to what has been erroneously argued 
by commentators such as J. Peter Pham or 
Jeffrey Herbst, the Congolese state is not 
inexistent beyond the major urban centres. It 
has developed into a twilight-styled construction 
that has forced main parts of the population to 
either accept predation or to find creative 
strategies to play according to the existing, often 
violent modes of social interaction. Local 
elections can, but only if held in an accountable 
manner, help restoring trust in the form of a 
new social contract between the state and its 
citizens. However, whether they will be executed 
remains a big question mark at this point. 
MONUSCO and FARDC are now starting military 
operations against FDLR and ADF. But the 
mission, and the international community, must 
also increase commitment to processes where they 
can make a difference. Implicating dozens of 
militias, the conflicts will not be terminated by the 
brigade and its fixed temporal mandate. The UN 
need to develop enough clout to force all conflict 
actors to negotiations more credible than the 
Kampala Talks or Sun City years before. They need 
to set up a thorough strategy to boost the new 
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration 
(DDR) programme just adopted by Congolese 
government. As much as ‘islands of stability’ may 
not tackle the ‘swamps of insecurity’, the Congolese 
government may not have the breath to stem large-
scale DDR alone. Such efforts, though, need to 
avoid past failures and be aware of prevailing 
networks of patronage that span from the national 
to the local levels. The latter had led to a situation 
whereby both government-led and international 
DDR initiatives were marred by distortion and a 
striking lack of follow-up in terms of sustainable 
social reintegration.  
Massive targeted international funding and joint 
oversight can help. However, stakeholders must 
be aware of the need to simultaneously address 
contingent conflict actors (thereby neutralising 
not armed groups in the first place but rather 
the security dilemmas in between the former) 
and put a particular emphasis on social and 
economic reintegration of demobilised 
combatants. These two points have been at the 
core of past failures, but policies of exempting 
so-called pyromanes-pompiers from sanctions as 
well as the strategy of buying off commanders 
and thus rewarding rebellion need to be 
stopped.31 If this guides new joint efforts on 
DDR, prospect may be brighter than in the 
recent past.  
 
With already more than demobilized 2500 
combatants (and wide over 3000 dependents) 
from over twenty armed groups cantoned in 
Bweremana, North Kivu,32 it is high time for the 
Congolese government and its international 
partners to kick-start reinsertion and 
reintegration measures. Should this not happen 
anytime soon, the demobilized will – as in many 
preceding examples – regain the forests and 














32 Confidential documents on file with the author. 
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